Monopolistic competition with a mail order business

Monopoly;Mail Order Selling

Borrower Poaching and Information Display in Credit Markets

The Riegle-Neal Act in the US and the Economic and Monetary Union in Europe are recent initiatives to stimulate financial integration.These initiatives allow new entrants to "poach" the incumbents' clients by offering them attractive loan offers.We show that these deregulations may be insuficient since asymmetric information seriously hampers the integration of credit markets.This asymmetry stems from the informational advantage incumbent banks have about their current clients vis-a-vis potential entrants.More-over, banks may strategically display some information hindering entry when asymmetric information is moderate.We also show that voluntary information sharing emerges only when asymmetric information is low.credit markets;economic integration;information;banking;competition;access to market

Softening Competition by Enhancing entry: An Example from the Banking Industry

We show that competing firms relax overall competition by lowering future barriers to entry.We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclose borrower information.By doing this, they invite rivals to enter their market.Disclosure of borrower information increases an entrant's second-period profits.This dampens competition for serving the first-period market.competition;banking;access to market;information

Phonebanking

Banking;Market Structure;Game Theory

Opt In versus Opt Out: A Free-Entry Analysis of Privacy Policies

There is much debate on how the flow of information between firms should be organized, and whether existing privacy laws should be amended.We offer a welfare comparison of the three main current policies towards consumer privacy - anonymity, opt in, and opt out - within a two-period model of localized competition.We show that when consumers find it too costly to opt in or opt out, privacy policies shape firms' ability to collect and use customer information, and affect their pricing strategy and entry decision differently.The free-entry analysis reveals that social welfare is non-monotonic in the degree of privacy protection.Opt out is the socially preferred privacy policy while opt in socially underperforms anonymity.Consumers never opt out and choose to opt in only when its cost is sufficiently low.Only when opting in is cost-free do the opt-in and opt-out privacy policies coincide.privacy;price discrimination;monopolistic competition;welfare

Price competition between an expert and a non-expert

price competition;product differentiation;quality

Essays in competition with product differentiation and bargaining in markets

The fourth essay uses bargaining theory and compares the outcome of a negotiation in two differently organized markets. In the first market, sellers simultaneously offer their good or service for sale. In the second market, sellers queue and offer their good or service sequentially for sale. Relevant markets are the taxi market and the inland waterways transport markets.

Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-Discrimination Constraint

Abstract: We study the competitive and welfare consequences when only one firm must commit to uniform pricing while the competitor’s pricing policy is left unconstrained. The asymmetric no-discrimination constraint prohibits both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint only leads to higher profits for the unconstrained firm if the monopolistic segment is large enough. Therefore, a regulatory policy objective of encouraging entry is not served by an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint if the monopolistic segment is small. Only when the monopolistic segment is small and rivalry exists in the competitive segment does the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint enhance welfare.Dominant firms;price discrimination;competition policy;regulation